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ABSTRACT 
We compared the governance of flood risk in England and the Netherlands, focusing on the 
general policies, instruments used and underlying principles. Both physical and political 
environments are important in explaining how countries evolved towards very different 
rationales of resilience. Answering questions as ‘who decides’, ‘who should act’ and ‘who is 
responsible and liable for flood damage’ systematically, results in a quite fundamental 
difference in what resilience means, and how this affects the governance regime. In the 
Netherlands, there is nationwide collective regime with a technocracy based on the merit of 
water expertise, legitimated by a social contract of government being responsible and the 
general public accepting and supporting this. In England there also is a technocracy, but this is 
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part of a general-political and economic-rational decision-making process, with 
responsibilities spread over state, insurance companies, individuals and communities. The 
rationales are connected to specific conceptions of the public interest, leading to specific 
governance principles. In both countries, flood risk strategies are discussed in the light of 
climate change effects, but resilience strategies show more persistence, although combined 
with gradual adaptation of practises on lower scales, than great transformations. 
Key words | climate change, flood risk management, governance, resilience, the Netherlands, 
United Kingdom 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few centuries societies have developed specific views on the governance of the 
public domain, especially with regard to the involvement and interrelationships of state, 
market and civil society (Arato & Cohen 1988; Edwards 2009). This has been accompanied 
by substantive and procedural principles related to decision-making and the specific roles of 
basic institutions in governance. Governance, however, is not only undertaken through social 
interaction, it also expresses and articulates existing social and institutional relationships or it 
creates new social relationships. This articulation is both through how decisions are made, but 
also by who acts and who has the responsibility for acting. One challenge of governance is the 
need to respond to the natural environment both to cope with and adapt to natural variability, 
including trend changes, such as climate change. Climate change creates new or increased 
risks that produce new governance dilemmas, and thereby tests existing and well-known 
principles (Haug et al. 2010; Termeer et al. 2011; Levin 2012). 
Both academic literature and political practice dealing with adaptation to climate 
change often contain references to ‘resilience’ as an end state or a central evaluative concept 
for assessing climate adaptation policies (e.g., Adger 2000; Walker et al. 2010). This makes 
sense, as society’s main challenge in a dynamic physical environment is to anticipate and 
adapt to inevitable changes and perhaps find new equilibriums. However, analysing 
adaptation strategies in water management reveals that social-ecological resilience acquires 
different meanings depending on the social context (Keessen et al. 2013) and this is especially 
the case when we compare adaptation in different countries. Although the academic literature 
seems to suggest the possibility of ‘universal’ templates in resilience strategies (e.g., creating 
reflexive strategies, embracing variety, having back-up options, stimulating participation, 
etc.), we would like to stress that there is neither one straightforward application of a resilient 
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strategy for societies nor one resilient socio-ecological system. What is considered a resilient 
system is, at least in part, dependent on existing social relationships or the ‘social contract’ 
(Adger et al. 2013) and thus on existing governance structures and approaches and what is 
deemed appropriate in the policy and governance context. We argue that the strategy for 
coping and adapting to the physical environment, and thus trying to provide resilience, is a 
product of the form of governance arrangements in that society. In turn, providing resilience 
cannot be treated as a technical problem. It fundamentally involves arguments about what are 
and what ought to be the dominant social relationships. 
In this contribution, we compare basic governance approaches in two countries, 
England and the Netherlands. In both countries, adaptation to climate change and related 
flood risks is considered highly relevant. Yet each has clearly different governance 
approaches which might reveal the prioritisation of other governance principles in the face of 
climate change. We will focus on topics related to flood risk management to make this 
comparison more fruitful and balanced and to be able to compare principles in similar policy 
domains. Our argument is that, in brief, the concept of resilience is different for English 
society and governance compared to Dutch society and governance. Different political 
theories evolved historically into a specific arrangement for water management and climate 
change, which provided different rationales for the role and interrelationships of the basic 
institutional spheres or mechanisms, in the common shorthand the state, market and civil 
society – the latter in the case of flood risks may refer to different models, the involvement of 
NGOs (such as WWF) or other organised groups, institutions of participatory democracy, 
communities as well as the direct involvement of the local citizens within flood risk 
management – and these, in turn, influenced the basic principles and instruments in policy and 
governance. 
New circumstances and new risks related to climate change challenge existing 
governance regimes, but pathways to reach new resilience equilibriums will be different. To 
put it more critically, the academic literature on adaptation and resilience generally pays too 
little attention to the differences in institutional path dependencies and the normative 
underpinnings of policy choices in the governance of adaptation. These underpinnings 
determine to a large extent what is possible or not, what is justifiable or not or what is 
considered legitimate. The central research question is how the challenges of climate 
adaptation are putting pressure on the existing governance arrangements and their underlying 
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normative principles: is climate change – and adaptation responses – leading to 
transformations in the rationales of resilience that have ruled governance in these societies? 
THEORY ON RESILIENCE AND METHODS 
The concept of resilience stems from biology and was introduced more widely by Holling to 
understand the dynamics of ecosystems, especially their capacity to persist in some original 
state while being subjected to all kinds of environmental changes or perturbations (Holling 
1973; Folke et al. 2010). Social science scholars were inspired by this and promoted the 
(holistic) idea of the crucial interrelationships and interdependencies between social and 
ecological systems. Part of the debate on – and perhaps confusion related to – resilience was 
that some stressed the importance of persistence ‘(…) as a buffer for conserving what you 
have and recovering to what you were’ (Folke et al. 2010, p. 6) and others stressed 
transformations and change of system regimes, while the stream of thought on social-
ecological systems embraced ‘change as a requisite to persist’ (Folke et al. 2010). 
Folke et al. (2010) attempted to combine both by saying that resilience is ‘the capacity 
of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change so as to still retain 
essentially the same function, structure and feedbacks, and therefore identity, that is, the 
capacity to change in order to maintain the same identity’ (Folke et al. 2010, Table 1). In this 
line of reasoning we must distinguish between adaptability as a capacity of systems ‘to learn, 
combine experience and knowledge, adjust its responses to changing external drivers and 
internal processes and continue developing within the current stability domains (…)’ and 
transformability as ‘ (…) the capacity to create a fundamentally new system (…)’. In other 
words, we have adaptability of regimes and transformability related to regime shifts, a 
transformation from one equilibrium to another. Adaptability and transformability can occur 
at multiple scales. Sometimes, changes at lower scales (e.g., on critical issues) are needed to 
preserve the regime as a whole (Folke et al. 2010). 
If we translate these, quite abstract, system-related ideas to the domain of water 
management and climatic change, the interdependent social-ecological system level would in 
our case be the English and Dutch society as a whole, whereas the social-ecological 
subsystem (lower scale) would in general be how flood risk management responds to the 
natural environment in terms of governance, policy discourse, including the leading 
governance principles and instruments. Even this subsystem level is too large and complex to 
tackle in one paper so we confine ourselves to the governance of sea and river floods: a 
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specific but prominent part of subsystem perturbations. As is elaborated in Keessen et al. 
(2013), resilience of social systems and related governance is not ‘neutral terrain’ but is 
dependent, next to the natural environment, on the political theories underpinning governance 
systems. These political theories steer and explain policy choices when it comes to adaptation 
to climatic changes. The question arises: What and who should be resilient? (Carpenter et al. 
2001; Berkhout 2005). Political theory guides the way societies think of resilience in relation 
to governance; there can, in fact, be different types of rationales to contribute to resilience: 
resilience can be embedded in collective arrangements for the whole of society (e.g., national 
social security based on solidarity as a resilient institution) or, following a more liberal or 
even libertarian conception of resilience, communities or individual citizens ought to be more 
self-dependent and resilient themselves. Resilience, in short, can be about higher and lower 
scale elements of systems, and addresses institutions, groups or individuals, largely dependent 
on the political-theoretical basis of societies and their academic scholars. 
Scholars on adaptation often stress diversity, polycentricity and flexibility (e.g., Folke 
et al. 2005; Pahl-Wostl 2008; for a critical discussion see Bakker & Morinville 2013) of 
governance and policy strategies. It seems as if the more diverse, polycentric and flexible a 
social-ecological system is, the more resilient it will be. In our view, however, many 
resilience and adaptation governance scholars use these ideas as (in fact, normative) templates 
and ignore the crucial role of the political groundings and deeply embedded governance 
principles in different societies. In the remainder of this article we try to unravel what often is 
not made explicit: the rationales behind the specific choices made in flood risk management. 
We will consider climate change and the adaptation challenge as an external perturbation 
influencing the policy subsystem. This system can adapt and persist, or transform its 
governance regime. Often, these responses will not have fully progressed. 
To relate the flood risk approaches to the above ideas of resilience theory, we will first 
describe the overall existing regime (what is the role of state, market or community in flood 
risk management; who decides on what issues; what are important principles of governance) . 
Then, we characterise contemporary flood risk strategies and discuss institutional changes in 
both societies, focusing on critical issues of political and societal debate, zooming in on issues 
of water and spatial planning, multi-layered safety and insurance systems. This functions as a 
way to discuss lower scale practices to see if they relate to larger scale system adaptability 
and resilience. We will be sensitive to proposed changes in policy concepts, policy discourse, 
principles and policy instruments that are used. While giving these features, we systematically 
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try to answer the following questions: Who should actually be resilient? Who is mainly 
responsible for damages? How are considerations made concerning the public interest? This 
leads to an overview of the typical Dutch and English rationales of resilience. 
Our analysis is based on data from different research projects on flood risks and 
climate change in England (this paper focuses almost exclusively on England due to the 
increasing differences in flood risk management arrangements among the countries of the 
UK; although there are some past and existing commonalities) and the Netherlands, both 
domestically and in a comparative perspective. These include the Dutch Knowledge for 
Climate Change program, more specifically a work package on normative principles in Dutch 
climate adaptation policy, where more than 20 interviews were held to describe both the 
principles and the focus of climate adaptation governance in the Netherlands, next to several 
smaller contract research projects. The English part was based on the expertise of the Flood 
Hazard Research Centre in London, that over the years has conducted a variety of research 
projects, e.g., for European comparative programmes (e.g., Knowledge for Climate, STAR-
FLOOD, Floodsite) and domestic research on the English insurance system. Next to this, 
crucial policy documents were analysed to discover the underlying principles of governance. 
We thus developed a ‘helicopter view’ on the flood risk policies in both countries. 
EXISTING FLOOD RISK GOVERNANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 
ENGLAND 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is a low lying delta of four major rivers. The Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt 
and the Ems flow through the Netherlands into the North Sea. The Netherlands is vulnerable 
to flooding. Some serious floods occurred a long time ago, for example the Allerheiligen 
floods in 1170, and the Zuiderzee floods in 1916. The most recent flood was in 1953 and 
caused over 1,800 fatalities, huge economic and ecological damage and is seen as the national 
trauma. Without protective measures like dykes, more than half of the Netherlands is 
threatened by flooding from the sea or the rivers. Two-thirds of the population lives in this 
flood-prone area and two-thirds of the gross domestic product is earned there. In all, there are 
more than 3,000 kilometres of dams and dykes to protect against flooding and low-lying 
polders are drained for agricultural purposes and to keep them habitable. The Dutch flood 
safety policy is based on the premise that the State is responsible for flood safety behind the 
dykes. This public approach is long based on provisions in the Dutch constitution that the 
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government takes care of the ‘habitability of the country’ and the protection and improvement 
of the environment (now Article 21 Dutch Constitution). This is further elaborated in the 
Water Act of 2009, as one of the goals of Dutch water management is flood prevention (Art. 
2.1 Water Act). The Dutch legal system provides for an elaborated public flood management 
system that applies to embanked areas. Rules provide for flood safety standards for different 
parts of the Netherlands, water management plans, measures banning activities on or near 
flood defences, water storage areas, maintenance, monitoring, and water management 
taxation. Therefore, the current Dutch flood safety management system has a strong public 
character. 
Two institutions are mainly responsible for flood risk management. At the national 
level, the minister for Infrastructure and Environment is formally responsible for strategic 
planning, setting norms and standards, and reports to the Parliament and the EU. The main 
operational institution at the state level is Rijkswaterstaat, a national governmental agency. 
This executive body is responsible for public works and water management of the larger 
waters (North Sea, Wadden Sea, the greater lakes, rivers and canals) and some flood defence 
works along the coast. At the sub-river basin level, the regional water boards are responsible 
for the integrated water management of regional waters, which includes the protection against 
floods. They are responsible for planning, design, building, maintenance and most of the 
financing and monitoring of flood defence works and water storage areas and the regulation 
of activities which may influence the risks of flooding. 
The current 23 Dutch water boards (hereafter called ‘water authorities’) arose 
originally out of thousands of community-based institutions, which institutionalised into 
regional, public water authorities (Van der Ven 1996). They have legislative power in the 
formulation of by-laws and make decisions with respect to the budget, annual accounts, taxes, 
control, water level, licensing and water management plans. They also have the authority to 
employ executive coercion. The central government mainly provides the national legal 
framework and a strategic policy. The provincial government supervises the water authorities 
and is authorised to establish or dissolve them. However, a recent low electoral turnout (24%) 
has prompted review and a potential shift towards indirect elections with municipalities 
electing board members for their residents or even to the abolishment of water boards (Van 
Rijswick & Havekes 2012). 
With flood risk management being practically a sole responsibility for state 
institutions in the Netherlands, there is little stimulus left for either market or communities to 
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take up flood management tasks themselves. Living in flood-prone areas is more or less the 
‘normal situation’ in most of the Netherlands. The only flood management tasks formally left 
to civil communities or citizens themselves is flood management in un-embanked areas and in 
the case of excessive rainfall-induced urban flooding. The strong role for the government in 
flood protection has not only led to extremely high standards of flood safety, but also to a 
serious lack of public awareness of flood risks (OECD 2014). 
Dutch policy instruments and principles 
Dutch water management is based on integrated long-term strategic planning and mid-term 
strategic and operational planning. In the national, provincial and regional water plans we find 
differentiated responsibilities for all governmental authorities. The Water Act contains flood 
risk safety standards and provides for a system of six yearly monitoring (to be changed in a 
ten year monitoring cycle) and reporting to the Parliament. These reports are followed by new 
investments in case the safety standards are not met. Although certainly not all flood defence 
works meet the safety standards (currently around 60% meets them), the constant 
programmatic investment and implementation of dyke improvement programmes has ensured 
that there were no serious floods in the last 60 years. 
The Dutch approach is characterised by the focus on prevention and the high flood 
safety standards which are established by an Annex to the Water Act. These legal standards 
determine the acceptable probability of flooding within the dyke rings. Although these 
standards are set differently for specific regions, they can be regarded as uniform standards 
because they follow a rationale of evenly spread risks. The west of the country has a 1:10,000 
flood risk because of the high economic and social consequences related to the dense 
population and sudden onset of sea floods that make evacuation problematic. The flood risk in 
the east of the country is around 1:1,200 years, because the economic and social consequences 
behind a ring of river dykes are less severe. It should be noted that each dyke ring has its own 
standard of protection, reflecting the principle of solidarity between the people within a dyke 
ring. 
Both at the national and the regional level, regulations apply that have the aim to 
prevent or regulate activities that may increase flood risks. A water permit from the water 
authorities is required for almost all activities that increase flood risks. In addition, the Water 
Act provides for several instruments to enable the authorities to build or maintain flood 
defence works, create space for the river or water storage areas. The water authorities have 
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far-reaching instruments to force citizens to accept works or – in the case of necessary storage 
– water on their land. Of course, these powers are combined with a duty to compensate 
disproportionate financial losses, based on the principle of equality for public burdens (egalité 
devant les charges publiques) or full financial compensation of the damage in case of water 
storage. 
Water management costs are around 6.5 billion Euro per year. Landowners (farmers), 
nature reserve organisations, businesses and residents pay a water management tax to their 
water board. Democratic legitimacy is guaranteed through the representation of various 
categories of stakeholders in the governing bodies of water boards (Van Rijswick & Havekes 
2012). In line with the adage ‘no taxation without representation’, each group can elect the 
water authority board members and is eligible to take a fixed number of seats on the board. 
The water boards’ tasks of water quantity control and flood protection are thus carried out on 
the basis of ‘stakeholder participation’ and the ‘benefit principle’. The financial mechanism 
exemplifies the importance of the solidarity principle: Those who benefit from the activities 
of the water authority pay taxes for its services and have a (proportionate) say in the assembly 
in return (the stake-pay-say triplet). Regional water authorities pay for maintenance of flood 
defence works and most of the investments in new flood defence works, and the state pays 
part of the costs for large investments in flood defence works and for flood defence works that 
affect more people than those who live in the water board region. 
By contrast, urban flooding in public urban areas is a municipal responsibility and 
citizens are responsible for floods in urban areas on their own territory, except when there are 
such exceptional circumstances that they cannot be expected to take care of their own flood 
risks. The duty to protect against urban flooding (from rain water, waste water collection 
systems or groundwater) is less stringently formulated than the responsibilities that rest on the 
regional water authorities. There are no legal standards and municipalities formulate their 
policy goals and foreseen measures and investments in a non-binding local plan, thus 
clarifying the division of responsibilities between the citizens and the municipality. In 
addition, municipalities have powers to regulate activities that may influence urban flood risks 
and they have the power to raise taxes for specific water management tasks. 
We conclude that the focus in Dutch flood risk management is therefore on the 
following leading principles: decentralisation, prevention and solidarity combined with cost 
recovery and classical democratic institutions for public participation, further elaborated and 
put into practice with the help of powerful legally binding public policy instruments. 
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England 
As part of an island, the runoff and hence river flows experienced by England are internally 
generated. Its rivers, in global and European terms, are considered to be small and only 15% 
of the population are at risk from flooding (Environment Agency 2009). Many catchments 
have little variation in terms of river flow and therefore resulting floods are often not large. 
However, flash floods do occur in upland areas creating the potential for significant risk to 
life. In turn, flooding does not constitute an extreme problem, average annual losses from 
flooding are estimated to amount to £650 million (Penning-Rowsell 2013) or 0.04% of 
national income. As in other countries, historically, flooding was framed in terms of the risk 
to agriculture and local flood risk management and hence the adoption of localised measures 
(Sheail 2002). Consequently, the traditional term for what is now called ‘flood risk 
management’ was ‘land drainage’. This changed only with the report of a Royal Commission 
in 1927 (culminating in the Land Drainage Act 1930) which established catchment boards and 
some sharing of the costs of works by central government. This was the start of the 
transformation of flood risk management onto a catchment basis. 
With the decline in the strategic significance of agriculture and food security, priorities 
shifted in the 1970s onwards to urban flood protection. Simultaneously, the rise of 
environmental concerns acted against further drainage of agricultural land and the consequent 
loss of biodiversity. Those environmental concerns also promoted the adoption of newer 
approaches, including floodplain rehabilitation as well as the continuation of traditional, 
environmentally friendly options such as flood storage areas. Simultaneously, the influence 
from the USA of non-structural options promoted the increased use of flood warnings, a move 
enabled by technological advances such as the early forms of weather radars, faster computers 
and telemetry for gauging. There was also a new concern with development on flood plains, 
what was then termed ‘flood plain encroachment’, again influenced by the non-structural 
movement in the USA. 
What was a long-standing trend in the UK towards integrated catchment management 
resulted in a more holistic approach to flood risk management being adopted (Nye 2011) and 
a shift away from simply a concern with direct flood losses to a wider framework of appraisal, 
notably to include the social consequences of flooding. Central government became 
increasingly involved in funding flood risk management and also for setting an overall 
strategy such as the Strategy for flood and coastal defence in England and Wales produced by 
the then Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF 1993). The changing emphasis 
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in FRM is exemplified by re-titling of that ministry as the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (Defra) in 2001. 
English policy instruments and principles 
Limiting development on flood plains increasingly became to be seen as a key issue. 
Government therefore set out to restrict the conditions under which new development would 
take place. First, guidance to planning authorities was issued in the form of a Planning Policy 
Guidance note Development and Flood Risk. Guidance notes were subsequently replaced by 
Planning Policy Statements. This guidance included a sequential test in the form of flow chart 
which limits what forms of development should be permitted in flood plains except in the 
absence of any alternative sites. 
Flood risk management also followed the wider shifts in water management policy 
towards a sustainable approach, including integrated water management. This included an 
emphasis on working with the natural system and also that we should learn to live with floods 
through non-structural measures. These approaches were formalised in a policy consultation 
‘Making space for water’ undertaken by Defra in 2004. This consultation and the subsequent 
response by Defra to the consultation responses, resulted in a number of pilot studies of 
innovative options for FRM. These were quite specifically intended to try alternative 
approaches and included rural runoff control, flood plain forests and resilient reconstruction 
(Halcrow 2008; Defra 2008). ‘Making space for water’ also anticipated a much greater degree 
of stakeholder engagement but there is limited evidence of this in practice. Perhaps the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004 provides for more involvement through the creation of local 
Resilience Forums to promote a co-ordinated preparation for emergencies and recovery, and 
response in emergencies. 
A major flood event occurred in England in 2007 and led to some significant changes 
in flood risk management resulting from an independent Government review (Pitt 2008). In 
that flood, a large fraction of the properties involved were flooded by pluvial waters and this 
directed attention to the control of runoff both in rural and urban areas. The Flood and Water 
Management Act 2010 (FWMA) was passed primarily to implement the remaining 
recommendations of the Pitt review, but also to transpose the EU Floods Directive into 
English Law. The Directive itself requires no more than previous practice in England. 
Adaptation to climate change has been part of UK government policy since the then prime 
minister, Margaret Thatcher, made a defining speech in 1989. A major consequence of 
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climate change is on rainfall amounts and patterns. FRM has therefore been able to ride on the 
back of the policy drive for climate change adaptation and the broader resilience debates. 
One important determining principle in England is that there is no statutory duty on 
any branch of government to protect land or property from flooding: all powers are 
permissive. The shift to central government involvement in decision-making and funding in 
flood risk management only started in 1930, but both decision-making and funding have 
become progressively more centralised. At the same time, flood risk management was 
increasingly included as part of the shift to integrated catchment management. This 
culminated in the creation of the Environment Agency (EA) in 1996. The ‘Making Space for 
Water’ strategy (Defra 2005) also established the first steps towards giving the EA a more 
overarching strategic role for flooding and coastal erosion risks, rather than purely operational 
responsibilities and it progressively sought to further centralise FRM decision-making. 
From 1930 onwards, central government contributed part of the costs of agreed 
schemes, the proportion depending upon assessments of local need. Following the 
establishment of the EA, although defences continued to be prioritised at a regional level, 
ultimately, decisions about which should receive funding was increasingly taken at a national 
level. The proportion of the costs of FRM works which is contributed by the general taxpayer 
has progressively risen (Parker & Penning-Rowsell 1980), until now effectively the entire 
costs of the works are borne by the general taxpayer. However, there have been some efforts 
to shift risk responsibility back towards local communities and away from state-funded 
defences. In particular, following the election of the Cameron government in 2010, the new 
National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy (Environment Agency 2011) 
incorporated the Coalition government’s localism philosophy in the form of the adoption of a 
partnership approach to flood management funding. Projects which do not qualify for full 
funding may now qualify for partial central funding, the balance being raised from local 
sources, the proportion of central funding being determined by a series of criteria (Defra 
2011). How this will influence where defences are built in the future is as yet unclear. 
Governments have no statutory duty to provide compensation of flood victims in 
England, but may contribute to charitable disaster relief funds. Since flood insurance is 
included as a standard peril in household insurance policies available on the private market, 
this gives homeowners a mechanism to recover flood losses. The insurance industry has now 
agreed a new basis for the provision of insurance against flooding with the UK government 
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(Defra 2013; Water Bill 2014). This involves a pooled approach to cross-subsidy of insurance 
premiums by those not at risk of flooding. 
Historically, UK governments have sought to base decisions on a determination of 
what is in the national or public interest. Defining management decisions in terms of the 
public interest implies that these are technical questions, which do not involve political 
judgement. What course of action delivers the national interest is then assumed to be 
objectively determinable. In contrast to the Netherlands, England does not have a minimum 
standard of defence; so, benefit–cost analysis has been adopted as a means of determining 
whether flood mitigation measures should be adopted in some areas, what standard of 
protection is the local optimum, and to set priorities. This is therefore used both to determine 
the most appropriate form of intervention in individual projects and which projects should be 
funded within the available budget. The National Audit Office, which is responsible to 
Parliament to determine whether public monies are being properly and efficiently used, in 
reviewing the EA’s performance has pushed the EA to improve the efficiency of spending 
(NAO 2007). Therefore, England has always perforce to employ a multi-layered strategy. 
In sum, the basic principles of flood risk governance are both state centralisation with 
an important role for local spatial planning. Flood risk management measures are determined 
according to the utilitarian principle and are weighted through a process of balancing the 
costs and benefits, thus permitting more diverse and tailored local strategies. There is also an 
increased responsibility on individuals, formerly through riparian duties and latterly through 
property-level protection, as well as through the widespread uptake of insurance. 
CRITICAL ISSUES AT THE FRONTIERS OF FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT 
In both the Netherlands and England, there are discussions on how to proceed with flood risk 
safety against the backdrop of increasing risks, climate change as well as changing ideas on 
governance. In the Netherlands, this was fuelled by the Second Delta Committee 
(www.deltacommissie.com) and in England this was mostly a response to increasing costly 
flood events that had great public impact. We will focus here on two critical issues that are 
illustrating both the dominant approach in each country and the (im)possibilities of changing 
strategies and underlying institutional change: water management and spatial planning, 
(including discussions of ‘multi-layered safety’) and insurance systems. 
Water management and spatial planning 
A universal problem is how to coordinate spatial and water management planning. 
Historically, it is fair to say that water management was the servant of spatial planning. 
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Making the ‘best’ use of land determined how water was managed, with water in an 
environment being heavily modified for this purpose and being sacrificed to the perceived 
needs of land use. In addition, spatial and water planning developed into different regimes: 
spatial planning generally being the responsibility of local municipalities with direct 
democratic accountability, whose decisions were typically subject to review and challenge. 
Local authorities both have to prepare a spatial plan and to provide development consent for 
major developments where refusal of consent can be appealed. Water management 
increasingly became seen as a scientific and technical problem and so responsibility has 
resided with engineering bureaucracies: the Environment Agency in England and 
Rijkswaterstaat (together with the water boards) in the Netherlands. Since the way land is 
used influences the flood risk on that area, such a division of responsibilities is no longer seen 
as viable. The problem is then, how to integrate water and spatial planning and how to include 
the implications for water management into land use planning decisions. 
The approach in England has been regulatory from the start; an early example being 
the Act promoted by the metropolitan authority for London in 1896. These were building 
controls rather than development controls and they limited the physical form of development 
rather than where development could take place. What developed recently are central 
government initiatives to impose systems of development controls starting with Planning 
Policy Guidance (PPG) 25 in 2001. This approach depended upon the progressive 
development of flood plain mapping as both hydrological and hydraulic modelling improved, 
together with the data to populate the models as well as the increasing availability of 
reasonably precise Digital Terrain Models. PPG25, and its replacement Planning Policy 
Statement (PPS) 25 (DCLG 2006), included riparian flooding and now, there is a duty on 
local flood authorities also to identify and take account of pluvial flooding. Mapping the latter 
areas stretches the capabilities of hydrological and hydraulic modelling. Land is now placed 
in one of three flood risk categories (flood zone 3: greater than 1 in 100 years (or 200 years 
for coastal); zone 2: between 1 in 100 years (or 200) and 1 in 1,000 years; and zone 1: less 
than 1 in 1,000 years), with the development potential for different land uses being designated 
for each. But PPS25 also includes a sequential test: a high risk site may be acceptable for 
susceptible developments only if there are no alternative sites. Although PPS25 was 
superseded in 2012 by web-based guidance 
(http://planningguidance.planningportal.gov.uk/blog/guidance/flood-risk-and-coastal-change/) 
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associated with the new National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), the conceptual 
framework for the consideration of flood risk remains unaltered. 
This development of flood plain mapping (a very early practice that preceded what the 
European Floods Directive now asks from Member States) and the making of development 
plans requires local authorities to prepare a Strategic Flood Risk Assessment of their area 
(DCLG 2012) and those proposing land development may be required to prepare an 
assessment of consequent flood risks. Two practical problems arise. First, once climate 
change projections of increases in river flows are taken into account, many existing urban 
core areas, which developed along a river frontage, now fall within the high risk flood zone: 
for example, 95% of the city of Hull lies on flood plains. More especially, the majority of the 
land which is available for redevelopment, land which was originally developed for industrial 
uses which have now ceased, is often on a flood plain. How to redevelop these urban centres, 
while simultaneously enabling socio-economic development and taking account of the 
increasing risk of flooding is a problem which has not yet been resolved. 
Second, there are two contrasting approaches to planning. Spatial planning is 
participatory, ultimately political and responding to multiple objectives and constraints. On 
the other hand, water planning is technocratic and single issue; the two have yet to be 
reconciled. The sequential test requires that the absence of reasonably available alternative 
development sites with a lower probability of flood be demonstrated before planning consent 
is granted. This strict test for flood risks sits uncomfortably with the more general spatial 
planning balancing approach, which uses trade-offs to manage complex systems. 
Similar to England, water management in the Netherlands served first agriculture and 
later other land use regulated by spatial planning as best as it could. But, parallel to England, 
water management evolved into a strongly sector-based policy, with a strict separation of 
water and land use functions. Only in the last decades has it become clear that spatial planning 
and building activities can have major implications for flood risk management. Starting with 
the coordination of plans in the field of water management and spatial planning a ‘water 
assessment’ or ‘water test’ has been developed. There is a mandatory duty for municipalities 
and provinces to ask the water board for advice on the consequences of spatial developments 
for water management and to motivate in their spatial plans how they have accounted for the 
effects on water management, including that of flood safety as well as water quality. Although 
the instrument of the water test led to a better understanding and more cooperation between 
water managers and spatial planners, the instrument is not yet fully effective. The main reason 
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for this is that spatial planners are not obliged to follow advice given by water managers and, 
in practice, we can see hardly any impact on the selection of planned development sites. 
A long-held common tradition has been to have certain polders flooded on purpose, to 
protect densely populated regions. This also asks for strong cooperation between spatial 
planning and water management. In the Water Act this common practice was formalised by a 
new instrument: the Water Storage Area. Regional water authorities in cooperation with 
municipalities can designate ‘storage areas’ in which water can be stored in cases of extreme 
rainfall or high waters in rivers. The designation is required to take place both in spatial as in 
water management plans (more specific in the leggers which are maps and tables with 
specified safety standards, characteristics of water bodies, maintenance responsibilities, etc.). 
The Water Act provides for a legal obligation of the land owner to accept water on his land 
but also for full compensation of all damage caused by this storage of water. 
Since 2009, with the coming into force of the Water Act, a stronger relationship 
between water plans and spatial planning is being established. Historically, the main problem 
in the relation between water management and spatial planning is that flood risk management 
trails after new developments and is required to enable those taking place. This leads to 
increasing responsibilities for water managers to ensure safety while higher economic and 
social risks are taken in flood-prone areas. This is what is called the safety paradox 
(Remmelzwaal & Vroon 2000; Wiering & Immink 2006). Although climate change and 
economic development are increasing the risks for land use, the costs of extra safety efforts 
are not paid by spatial planners (municipalities), urban developers or people that will live or 
work in these new developed areas, but continue to be borne by water authorities and in the 
end by all citizens living within the territory of a certain water board. In other words, all 
citizens (the collective) within the territory pay for the high risk vulnerability of additional 
land use. 
Multi-layered safety 
At this moment we see shifts in the discussion on the classic flood risk management approach 
in the Netherlands. Although Dutch flood risk management has been adapting over the 
centuries due to societal and physical changes we can also see some recent shifts in (flood) 
risk governance. The concept of multi-layered safety (MLS), as introduced in the Dutch 
National Water Plan of 2009, is a central element in this discussion. In short, it is discussed 
that the Dutch approach should evolve from a flood probabilities approach to one that takes 
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into account both flood probabilities and consequences (for human health, the environment, 
cultural heritage and economic activity). It is proposed to start reasoning from three layers: 
flood defence is still key in water management, but should, in case additional measures are 
necessary, be supplemented by a second layer of mitigation measures in the field of spatial 
planning and building requirements and a third layer of disaster management – flood 
preparation and recovery (Delta decision to be taken by the Parliament in September 2014; 
Tromp & Ellen 2012). Possible spatial measures include the elevation or flood-proofing of 
houses, re-locating of houses and the compartmentalisation of the areas within a dyke ring. 
Disaster management asks for flood forecasting and warning systems, organisational 
measures such as evacuation plans and related training, as well as physical measures, such as 
sandbags, in cases where flood defences fail. 
This new flood risk approach is in line with, and actually promoted by, the Floods 
Directive (Directive 2007/60/EC) (Veiligheid in Kaart, Delta programme). It is not wholly 
new; it simply renders explicit the previously very implicit societal determinants of the height 
and width of dykes. However, it opens the door to different responses to reduce flood risks. 
This may question the domination of public water management and existing expertise in flood 
risk management. Reducing adverse consequences requires cooperation with different actors, 
like municipalities, but also with non-governmental actors who own property in flood-prone 
areas. Taking multi-layered safety one step further means that we might shift responsibility in 
the first layer to the other layers, that is, from Dutch water authorities to a broader range of 
governmental authorities; provinces and municipalities responsible for spatial planning, civil 
protection, economic affairs and agriculture. It also might entail a shift from the 
predominantly public sphere to the public and private sphere when measures are to be taken. 
Third, we might see the underpinning normative principles, from uniform ‘equal risks in 
water safety for all’ based on regional solidarity, move towards a more differentiated, nuanced 
approach where there is more room for regional differentiation of safety norms and private 
responsibilities (Van Rijswick & Havekes 2012). 
If multi-layered safety would become the new dominant discourse in water 
management, we could witness an important change in thinking in the domain of Dutch flood 
safety. Although at this moment there already exist a responsibility for municipalities to take 
care of ‘good spatial planning’ which comprises taking care of flood safety by not building in 
flood-prone areas or by prescribing specific building requirements that improve the safety of 
citizens, municipalities have failed to take this responsibility seriously. Many building 
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developments have occurred in flood-prone areas, thus increasing flood risks for thousands of 
people. The same goes for evacuation plans and training for calamities. Municipalities and 
provinces cooperate in so-called safety regions, because they are formally responsible for 
disaster risk management. However, this cooperation is not extended to the water authorities. 
This is a serious omission, in view of the water authorities’ legal responsibility to develop and 
test flood calamity plans. 
In England there is a different conceptualisation of multi-layered safety which 
includes both interventions before, during and after a flood and also in terms of control of 
runoff, flood storage and flood conveyancing. While this continues to evolve, it has existed in 
some form in England for decades and this multi-facet approach to flood management is 
commonplace. Although this approach shares some commonalities with the Netherlands, the 
holistic approach adopted in England is broader. This is, in part, a reflection both of the 
difference in the nature of the flood risk in the two countries and England’s lower 
prioritisation of defence. 
Insurance systems: Financial resilience from flooding 
Flood insurance has long provided a mechanism for recovery for flood losses in England 
(Arnell et al. 1984), and since the 1960s, the system has been resilient to change both in terms 
of flood management dynamics and to other external pressures. From its inception, flood 
insurance has been part of the private market and responsibility for recovery from damages 
has rested primarily with the individual. Johnson & Priest (2008) describe the role of insurers 
and the provision of insurance as being adjunct to that of other aspects of flood management 
policy in the UK as responsibility is removed from the state. The long-term role of the private 
market in England is reinforced by the traditional stance by UK Government not to pay 
compensation for flood losses. The division of labour between the private market, the 
government agencies and those at risk in this area is complex as although the financial risk 
falls squarely on the private companies (and to some extent those purchasing insurance) 
ultimately insurers would be less able to provide (affordable) insurance without government 
(and taxpayer) intervention in providing measures for flood risk management. 
The refusal of the insurance industry to continue with the previous system due to 
concerns about its future viability has resulted in the introduction of the so-called ‘Flood-Re 
system’ (Defra 2013). This has a number of potential consequences for the balance between 
the roles of the individual, the private market and the state in the provision of flood recovery. 
Essentially, the new approach retains flood insurance within a private market by formalising 
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the existing cross-subsidisation of flood insurance premiums between low and high risk 
properties. It does so for the medium term, but only for low and middle income households. 
The new approach reinforces the reliance on, and acceptance of, a private market recovery 
mechanism from flooding and although the UK Government will have increased roles (as a 
regulator monitoring and enforcing compliance and as arbiter in times of high loss) (Defra 
2013) they ultimately are still removed from the direct provision of recovery. 
The system of Financial Resilience from flooding in England is fundamentally 
dichotomous. Responsibility for purchasing cover and having individual resilience is at the 
household level; however, the viability of the market is maintained through the spreading of 
the burden spatially and ultimately therefore resilience is achieved through the collective 
capacity of policyholders. Private market insurance requires heterogeneity of flood risk within 
the insured population so that these risks can be spread. This situation is present in England, 
with its high variability of flood risk, but not in the Netherlands. However, this system of 
resilience to financial recovery, is fundamentally inhibiting the development of household-
level resilience to flood risk, with Johnson & Priest (2008) describing the inherent conflicts 
present. The current system has not succeeded in increasing the uptake of household flood 
management measures nor incentivised individual-scale risk reduction and there is little 
evidence to suggest that the new system will improve on this. Furthermore, the system of 
cross-subsidisation is impacting on the distributional consequences of flood management and 
is potentially promoting socially inequitable flood management as those at lower risk are 
directly subsidising the costs of those who live at high risk (Penning-Rowsell & Pardoe 
2012). Despite these associated problems flood insurance is still considered to be fundamental 
to providing societal resilience to flood damages at all scales. 
Following the 1953 coastal storm surge flood, insurers declared the Netherlands 
uninsurable for flood events. As a consequence, the government may provide disaster relief 
by paying on an incidental base parts of extraordinary damages. This arrangement is 
established under the 2010 Security Regions Act: government may award state funds to those 
suffering damage caused by a disaster, of which a serious flood would certainly qualify (Van 
Rijswick & Havekes 2012). This possibility for partial compensation of damage caused by 
floods should not be compared to the no-fault compensation regime based on the Water Act in 
case damage has been caused by measures employed to prevent flooding (van Doorn-
Hoekveld 2014). Additionally, no-fault liability compensation based on the Water Act is not 
routinely provided for all losses, only burdens which are considered to be abnormal (i.e., 
disproportionately large in comparison to others) are offered compensation (van Doorn-
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Hoekveld 2014) and even then the amounts provided are limited. Compensation of damage by 
water authorities is also possible within the fault liability regime. The latter could lead to the 
liability of water authorities in those cases where damage is caused because water authorities 
did not fulfil their obligations to take care that flood defence works met the required 
standards. Furthermore, in 1995, the Dutch government entered a covenant with the Dutch 
Association of Insurers to establish a calamities fund, however this agreement was not 
finalised as it was reasoned that the Dutch Constitution states the government is responsible 
for the ‘habitability of the land’. Therefore, the degree to which any compensation fund 
assists or promotes societal resilience is questionable. 
Over the last few years, the discussion on introducing insurance was revived in the 
light of future climate changes in order to create a back-up system for disastrous events with 
the advantages, limitations and difficulties in implementation being widely discussed (e.g., 
Botzen & van den Bergh 2008; Aerts & Botzen 2011). To date, in the Netherlands there is the 
possibility to insure crop damage caused by heavy rainfall (Van Rijswick & Havekes 2012). 
In addition, since September 2012, a company has been offering the first flood insurance 
project in the Netherlands covering a damage of up to €75,000 (http://www.lloyds.com/news-
and-insight/news-and-features/environment/environment-2013/lloyds-supports-unique-flood-
solution-in-the-netherlands); however, uptake has been very low. This new provision, and 
other debates, reintroduced the notion of introducing compulsory flood insurance. Discussions 
concerning a flood insurance system of this nature in the Netherlands are difficult due to the 
special situation of the country: a tendency for low probability and high impact flood events 
which greatly hinder the spreading of the risk. The subject seems to be highly political, 
including several opposing positions, and, most recently, the EU (an advocate of the use of 
insurance schemes for flood resilience) has joined national government political parties, 
NGOs, commerce, agriculture and citizens in the debate about these issues. 
Mandatory flood insurance does not appear to be a good option for Dutch society for 
several reasons. First, the introduction of a mandatory private flood insurance scheme does 
not fit with the Dutch conceptualisation of resilience: one that focuses on prevention of the 
whole society accomplished by hydraulic systems combined with more natural flood risk 
management in recent years. Second, it was argued that mandatory insurance is not fair for 
those who chose to live in safe areas as they would not require cover and provides a 
disincentive to residing in those safe areas. Third, the viability of a private market insurance is 
uncertain as by excluding those not at risk would mean that risk could not be spread 
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sufficiently broadly. Finally, there are also concerns about whether a mandatory system would 
satisfy competition regulations. 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGIES AND RATIONALES IN THE 
NETHERLANDS AND ENGLAND 
As was explained in the Introduction, domestic governance of flood risks reflects both a 
specific ‘division of labour’ of state, market and communities, and specific principles that 
guide societal opinion and political decision-making. Governance approaches thereby reveal 
certain conceptions of resilience. Below we try to summarise typical characteristics of the 
approaches in the two countries. 
First and foremost, England and the Netherlands differ in their physical environment 
and in the nature of flood risks. This obviously leads to dissimilarities in approaches; England 
is positioned on an island, has smaller rivers and only a small part of the country is at risk of 
serious flooding. Floods are generally expected to be annoying and damaging events rather 
than as life-threatening. Historically, there was neither a duty to provide flood alleviation nor 
to provide financial compensation for the British government. England, as well as other parts 
of the UK, had adopted the principle of catchment management and of integrated water 
resources management already in an early stage. Subsequently, flood risk management has 
been embedded in the wider context of sustainable development and of climate change 
adaptation. 
By contrast, the Netherlands is known for its high vulnerability to flood risks: about 
25% lies below sea level and more than 60% would be flooded without technical measures 
(dams, sea and river dykes and embankments). A long history of large river and sea floods has 
created a national narrative of ‘the battle against water’. Reproduced in state documents, 
public communication and even in commercials, flood events are viewed as life-threatening. 
Flood policy belongs therefore to the realm of high politics and should be positioned ‘above 
all other stakeholders’, and away from daily politics. This is reflected in Dutch water and 
flood risk governance: it has a specific, functional institutional layer consisting of regional 
water boards and the national agency Rijkswaterstaat. The problem of adaptation to climate 
change is incorporated by these strong and prevailing water managers too. 
When we turn to the governance approaches in the two countries in more detail, 
England shows a gradually increasing role for central government, although it is very cautious 
in inviting too much state responsibility. There is a high degree of centralisation, but most of 
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the work still has to be done by the local authorities, especially when it comes down to the 
balancing of flood risks against other spatial claims. Although government has an important 
role in creating (legal) conditions for catchment planning and integrated management and in 
supervising these tasks, it is expected that market and communities bear their own 
responsibilities in flood risk management; the insurance market is an important – also political 
– player in the field and as the state has no financial obligations in flood recovery, people are 
expected to protect and prepare themselves for flood events. Because of this, flood risk 
management is part of general cost–benefit considerations and all parties seek the most 
efficient solution to shared problems. 
On the Netherlands we can be brief. Generally, there is hardly any formal role, nor 
formal responsibility, for the market and communities, except for in un-embanked areas and 
for urban flooding; with those exceptions, flood governance is firmly in the hands of the state 
institutions, although recent policy concepts are challenging the predominant role of state 
water management. Dutch public authorities have (potentially) strong powers and resources 
although the instrument of the expropriation of land is rarely used. The government prefers 
less far-reaching instruments such as regulation and duties to tolerate water or public works, 
monitoring and maintenance on one’s land (‘gedoogplichten’). 
In England, the option of acquiring properties and land to take flood risk measures 
simply because they are at high risk of flooding is not an option. As with the idea that 
governments should provide compensation to victims of natural or other disasters, the Finance 
Ministry, HM Treasury, does not accept that this is an appropriate use of public money (Defra 
2003) and will consequently not authorise the relevant government department to make such 
payments (HM Treasury 2013). These payments seldom occur in the Netherlands either, 
because damages are preferably prevented instead of recovered afterwards. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the analysis of approaches in flood risks management and the related conception 
of resilience. 
As the table shows, the two countries differ in their interpretation of resilience. In 
England, the focus is first of all on the resilience of households, local communities and firms. 
This is exemplified by the creation of local Resilience Forums whose members include the 
public utilities and local industry as well as the local authorities and emergency services 
(Cabinet Office 2013). The Dutch conception of resilience is centred more on maintaining the 
resilience of the collective, secured by an existing system of flood defences, thus enabling 
society to live in economically important, densely populated but also vulnerable areas of the 
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country. Dutch resilience is thus seen more in the light of ‘high vulnerability’ of society as a 
whole – in need of collective – state protection. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the Introduction we discussed how challenges of climate change and related adaptation are 
putting pressure on existing governance arrangements and their underlying normative 
principles. We first gave an overview of the existing governance arrangements while asking 
such basic questions as ‘who decides’, ‘who should act’ and ‘who is responsible for flood 
damage’ (see Table 1). The answers are fundamentally different. As we have seen, in 
England, the focus is on the resilience of households, communities or firms in light of the 
economy as a whole. The Dutch conception of resilience is centred more around maintaining 
the resilience of the collective, secured by the existing system of flood defences which assures 
robustness as part of resilience thinking, coupled with state liability in case the water 
authorities do not fulfil their obligations and the possibility that the state declares a flood 
event a disaster and pays part of the damage and recovery costs. 
However, any comparison will have a tendency to accentuate the differences and 
overlook the similarities. One of the interesting surprises of our analysis is that in both 
countries, there is a centralised state, and flood risk management is treated as a technical 
problem that is appropriately addressed through a technocratic bureaucracy. But while this is 
so, the operating principle is again different: in the Netherlands there is a technocracy based 
on the merit of water expertise and legitimated by a strong idea of a collective public interest. 
In the terms of Alexander (2002) there is a ‘unitary’ conception of the public interest. This 
leads to a social contract of government being responsible for flood risks and the general 
public accepting and supporting this idea. In England there also is a technocracy, but this is 
more part of a general political decision-making process, with responsibilities spread over 
state, insurance companies, individuals and communities. Consequently, there is a stronger 
role for cost–benefit considerations, reflecting a more utilitarian conception of public interest, 
but also a stronger political debate – flood risk management is a matter of ‘between 
stakeholders’ instead of ‘above all stakeholders’. In other words, in England a cost–benefit, 
economic rationale is hegemonous, while in the Netherlands a water-expertise and nation-
wide collective, ‘unitary’ rationale dominates. The use of benefit–cost analysis in England 
may, however, be argued to have promoted a search for alternative means of intervening, 
interventions that would in an individual case pass the benefit–cost ratio test, and 
differentiated responsibilities. Conversely, to some extent, the Dutch requirement to meet 
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legislative fixed standards of protection might be argued to have limited both diversification 
in practice and, to some extent, diversification in research in the Netherlands. 
The main theoretical question was whether we could conclude on ‘adaptability and 
persistence’ or transformation of governance regimes and their rationales. We therefore 
discussed lower scale practices to see if they reflect larger scale system adaptability and 
resilience. We looked at the role of water management and spatial planning, including multi-
layered safety, and the role of insurance in both countries. For the Netherlands the discourse 
of ‘multi-layered safety’ is relatively new. It would potentially lead to a regime shift from 
predominantly flood defence to strategies that deal with flood consequences: flood mitigation, 
preparation and recovery. An important side effect might be a shift from clear and legally 
regulated responsibilities of the water authorities, to more blurred shared responsibilities of a 
whole range of public authorities. Discussion is about the responsibility, accountability and 
finally even liability in cases floods do occur and cause damage. The approach shows changes 
in the role of current principles in flood risk management, as for example solidarity and 
prevention. From both a legal perspective and a general societal point of view (do people 
expect changes) a real regime shift is not desirable: the first layer of flood defence is simply 
considered indispensable in Dutch society. In recent political debates this is reflected: the 
second layer of spatial mitigation measures and the third layer of disaster management are 
actually not considered to be replacing the first layer, but are considered to be (only) 
additional. This is actually evidence of the strong path dependencies that surround the first 
layer; the Dutch can simply not imagine not to be protected by their safety infrastructure and 
technology. 
In England there is a debate about flood risks in highly vulnerable areas such as those 
cities built in flood plains or near the coast (e.g., Hull). Both countries are perhaps even 
evolving towards each other. As we have seen, there are ideas of a more spatially oriented 
flood risk policy in the Netherlands, which would then create responsibilities for other 
governmental authorities than the water authorities, but at the same time the Dutch stick to the 
‘first layer’ preventive approach as we have seen above. Also, the Dutch are becoming more 
cost-aware. In England, the increased reliance on general taxpayer funding of all mitigation 
works has created an inflationary pressure for central government action: as demonstrated in 
the flood victims’ reaction to the winter 2013/2014 floods. Furthermore, given the inheritance 
of 5.2 million properties at risk (EA 2009), there has been increased focus on property-level 
measures to reduce individual and community vulnerability. But, again, this is more reflecting 
26 
 
path dependencies and confirming existing decision-making than transformational regime 
shifts. 
As a final concluding remark, we can see that flood risk management is, in fact, under 
pressure in both countries. The dominant role of the state but also the general principles of 
solidarity and prevention are not abandoned, but now more critically discussed in the 
Netherlands and the state, market and community -relationships are heavily debated in 
England too. In both cases, climate change leads to adaptation as fine-tuning of existing 
regimes in light of regime persistence rather than regime transformation. 
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Table 1 | Characteristics of flood risk approaches and conceptions of resilience 1 
Flood risk 
approaches 
England Netherlands Similar/Different? 
Contemporary 
governance regime 
for flood risk 
management  
Strong role of state in 
creating conditions 
and setting rules; but 
also substantial role 
of market (insurance) 
and the individual 
Strong role of state, 
weak role of market, 
communities or 
individuals  
Different 
Who decides on flood 
risk management and 
protection? 
A combination of 
central government, 
local authorities 
(spatial planning) and 
residents/ individuals 
(flood proofing, 
insurance, etc.) 
Mainly the functional 
layers of water 
management (national 
and regional), but people 
can vote and participate 
in formal procedures of 
water institutions 
especially the regional 
water authorities 
Different = 
Diverging 
conception of  
resilience  
Leading flood risk 
management 
principles 
Both centralisation 
and local spatial 
planning, utilitarian 
conception of public 
interest; diversity and 
tailor-made measures 
Decentralisation, 
prevention and solidarity 
within dyke rings, more 
unitary, collective 
measures 
Commonalities in 
both central 
responsibilities and 
decentralisation. 
Generally 
diverging in type 
of measures 
Dominant flood risk 
strategies 
(diversification) 
Multi-layered 
approach: proactive 
spatial planning, 
flood defence, flood 
warnings to enable 
those at risk to take 
action to reduce flood 
Flood defence by 
building a reliable 
technical system, 
combined with more 
natural flood defence 
and better spatial 
planning, which 
Different = 
Diverging 
conception of 
resilience 
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losses, and recovery 
system  
government should take 
of. However, now 
discussing multi-layered 
safety  
Who should be 
resilient? 
Society, communities 
and individuals  
Society as a whole 
because large floods will 
affect the whole of 
society 
Different = 
Diverging 
addressee of 
resilience 
Responsibility for 
flood damages? 
No duty for 
government. In the 
end, individuals are 
responsible 
In the end, within the 
system of dyke-ring 
protection, the collective 
(state) is responsible and 
taxpayers pay for the 
damages 
Different = 
Diverging 
addressee of 
resilience 
Main rationales in 
approach to flood risk 
management and 
related rationale of 
resilience 
A rational analysis to 
determine what is in 
the national interest 
e.g., the use of 
benefit–cost analysis 
to determine what 
standard of 
protection should be 
provided where. 
Economic rationale 
Flood risk is an 
overarching ‘unitary 
public interest’ therefore 
a ‘technical matter’ of 
water experts that secure 
the system; the state is 
responsible. Water-
technical rationale 
Different = 
Diverging 
underpinnings of 
resilience 
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